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ABSTRACT
Can rational choice modeling explain destructive behavior among the Taliban, Hama and other
radical religious militias? This paper proposes a club good framework which emphasizes the
function of voluntary religious organizations as efficient providers of local public goods in the
absence of government provision. The sacrifices which these groups demand are economically
efficient (as in Iannaccone (1992)) and make them well suited for solving the extreme principal-
agent problems present in militia production. Thus the analysis can explain why religious radicals
create such effective militias. Seemingly gratuitous acts of violence by group members destroy their
outside options, increasing the incentive compatibility of loyalty. The analysis has clear implications
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2 Mishal and Sela (2000), p. 71.
3 Political violence with a religious justification by sects has a long history in Islam, as in other
monotheistic religions (see below). It was widely denounced when it reappeared in Egypt in the mid 20
th century.
“We must examine the costs and benefits of continued armed operations.” 
M. Al Zahar, a Hamas leader, 
quoted in Al Quds, (East Jerusalem: October 1995).
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I INTRODUCTION
The Taliban, Hamas and other radical Islamic groups present a challenge to behavioral scientists
who assume rational choice in individual decisions. How do we explain destructive acts from
which individuals derive no direct benefit such as subjugation and institutional abuse of women,
minorities and homosexuals, closing of schools and hospitals, enforcement of general strikes,
abuse and murder of prisoners, or desecration of holy sites? Why do radical religious sects so
often turn to militia activity, and why are their militias so effective?
Members of these radical religious groups are hardly your typical “bad guys.” They
exhibit productive, constructive and noble behaviors: acts of piety, charity and self-sacrifice. The
same organizations are also remarkably efficient providers of valuable local public goods. The
Taliban restored law and order to Afghanistan, halting poppy cultivation (for opium) and
reducing crime. By securing trade routes they restored commerce (both legal and illegal) in
Afghanistan. Both the Taliban and Hamas’ parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood reduce
drug addiction among members. The Muslim Brotherhood provides health care, schooling,
welfare and community services to needy communities in Gaza and the West Bank. The
Brotherhood is so efficient and honest that it was often used by humanitarian agencies to
distribute aid in the West Bank and Gaza.
Are these extreme, violent, behaviors due to powerful entrenched ideologies which form
preferences? That argument is weakened by sharp shifts in declared ideology and behavior. The
Taliban in 1994 were nonviolent clerics concerned with personal piety and replacing violent
warlords with local Islamic government. By 1996 they were a militia bent on conquering
Afghanistan and by 2001 they were so committed to international Jihad that they destroyed their
accomplishments in a doomed effort to protect Al Qaeda. The Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine
was a nonviolent group dedicated to an agenda of personal piety and local Islamic government
till they created Hamas and embarked on a violent, nationalist territorial struggle. More
generally, the sanctification of political violence as Jihad by radical Islam is a recent
phenomenon, a break with mainstream Muslim theology (Black, 2001, p. 338).
3
Also remarkable is that, once formed, both Hamas and Taliban became remarkably
efficient militias. The Taliban, who were not experienced fighters, managed to conquer and hold2
4 For evidence of the Hamas’ effectiveness at suicide attacks see Berman and Laitin (2003).
5 The late Ehud Sprinzak emphasized the importance of rational choice models of terrorism (Sprinzak,
2000) for policymaking.
most of Afghanistan, an accomplishment unmatched by even the Soviet military. The Hamas
quickly evolved into an effective terrorist organization, difficult to infiltrate and more effective
than its secular rival, the PLO’s Tanzim, or than the more experienced Islamic Jihad.
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This paper attempts to resolve all those puzzles at once, using an approach which
assumes rational choice by individuals. Rationalization is not merely a methodological goal but
has a practical implication. If we cannot explain these destructive behaviors in a model in which
individuals respond to incentives, what policy solutions could we recommend that are not
themselves inherently destructive?
5
I use a “club-good” approach to model radical religious groups. Imagine a community for
which neither government nor markets function well. Local public goods usually provided by
government such as public safety, law and order and welfare services are poorly provided or
absent, while neither public nor private sectors efficiently deliver education, health services or
insurance. It would not be surprising for individuals in such a place to band together into
communities which provide public safety, education, welfare services, and other local public
goods through mutual insurance (as documented by Townsend (1994), for instance).
Iannaccone (1992) pointed out that religion is a natural organizing node for community
provision of local public goods. Moreover the most puzzling features of religious sects, their
propensity to limit choices (prohibitions) and to destroy resources and options (sacrifices), can
be explained by the internal distortions due to a club’s efficient provision of services to
members. Since club members engage in joint production of local public goods during their
hours of nonmarket time, market work is a distraction with a negative externality for other
members. So efficient clubs should tax market wages. Lacking tax authority they might turn to
prohibitions on consumption as a crude but feasible way of lowering wages. Sacrifices can be
explained as a costly signal of “commitment” to the community, or (less prosaically) a signal of
relatively poor economic options outside the club which are efficient in the presence of
heterogeneity in economic opportunities. A sacrifice is then an initiation rite allowing
membership and with it access to club goods.
Iannaccone provides supporting evidence for the club model from data on Christian
denominations, showing that the more extreme the prohibitions and sacrifices, the greater the
provision of public goods to members. Berman (2000) extends that argument in an application to
Ultra-Orthodox Jews, showing that subsidies to sects dramatically increase distortion of
incentives. Among Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jews subsidies caused fertility to increase by over a
child per woman and duration of Yeshiva (full time religious seminary) attendance to increase by
over10 years, all within two decades. Berman and Stepanyan (2003) provide further evidence of
high fertility and generally low returns to schooling among Muslim sects in five countries.3
6 Like the Taliban and Hamas they had strict prohibitions and sacrifices, including vows of celibacy, for
instance. These groups also underwent an agenda drift. Long after the Crusades, the Templars were still running
fiefdoms in much of France, till they were finally suppressed by the King. I thank Dagobert Brito for pointing out
this historical analogy.
This paper makes two further analytical points. First, religious clubs are well suited to
running militias. Militias are crucially sensitive to defection. Thus a club which extracts signals
of commitment has an advantage in militia activity. The analysis evokes Becker’s theory of
rational crime (Becker, 1968), in that individuals weigh the benefits of remaining loyal to or
defecting from behavioral norms, with the twist that the norms may be those of an illegal militia.
Second, apparently gratuitous acts of destruction can both signal commitment and reinforce
incentive compatibility, extending the ability of the club to provide militia services to members.
Thus, cruel and apparently meaningless destruction may be rational and efficient for a militia.
Anticipating the results, the key policy implication of this analysis is that an efficient
economy and a secular state providing public goods both weaken religious sects as members
become less desperate for the economic services these sects provide. That process compromises
the ability of sects to run militias. This paper is not about Al Qaeda, but the reader might well
wonder if economics can really be that important --the September 11
th terrorists were educated
and far from poor. Yet those terrorists were not typical members. One would hardly expect Al
Qaeda to send some of its’ thousands of semi-literate mercenaries in Afghanistan to flight school
in Florida if disaffected students in Europe were available. The general point is that a club which
is strengthened by its ability to provide local public goods in a failed state with a failed economy,
like Afghanistan, may attract members for a number of reasons. It could then select leaders and
combatants from among those members according to characteristics other than poverty.
Though radical Islamic militias motivate the discussion, there is nothing inherently
Muslim about the model. Militia activity among religious sects dates back at least to the Middle
Ages, when the Templar Knights and the Hospitaler Knights organized as orders to conquer the
holy land during the Crusades.
6 The analysis is also applied to the “Jewish Underground,” a
terrorist organization of Orthodox Jewish settlers on the West Bank in the early 1980s. The
model explains their demise as an example of a militia that overstepped its reach, violating an
incentive compatibility condition by taking on a project too destructive for its base of support. 
The next section provides background on the Taliban and Hamas, highlighting the
common puzzles and drawing parallels. Section III reviews the club model for a religious sect,
extending it to explain militias by developing a militia production function. Section IV applies
that model to explain the jarring combination of efficiency, piety and destructiveness in these
groups. Section VI considers the Jewish Underground and other radical religious militias.
Section VII considers policy implications and section VIII concludes.4
7 Public Finance, in this tradition, designs policy for states in relationship to individuals, not groups.
8 Ben-Porath [1980] emphasizes nonmarket exchange in his “F-connection” approach to Sociology.
II TALIBAN AND HAMAS: BACKGROUND
Radical Islam
The Taliban and Hamas are both highly ritualistic, extremely conservative Muslim groups. They
belong to a family of radical sects whose religious behavior represents a clear break from
traditional practice. They augment the prohibitions of traditional Islamic practice, such as dress
codes and shaving. They tend to segregate themselves from other Muslims and to be extremely
intolerant of deviation, in contrast to the tolerance of traditional Islam. Though often termed
“fundamentalist” – as if returning to some historic norm of practice, these groups actually
practice norms unprecedented in their extremism. Radical Islam dates back only to the 1920s
with the establishment by al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Mawdudi’s
subsequent founding of the Jamaat-al-Islami in Pakistan. 
Radical Islamists are an example of a group whose core beliefs clash with those of
Western liberalism in their view of an individual’s place within society. In the Western liberal
approach individuals have rights and obligations in a direct relationship with the state.
7 In
contrast, Radical Islam emphasizes a more historic approach in which an individual’s primary
relationship is with a clan, sect or tribe, and through that with the state [Black (2001), p. 309]. 
Ties that might undermine that relationship are viewed with suspicion.
Those strong historical affiliations with clans, sects and tribes are not surprising if
government is a poor provider of local public goods such as health care, education and public
safety and if the market is an inefficient provider of income and insurance. In that environment,
group affiliation is a source of mutual insurance, providing protection, health care, income, food,
clothing and the like. Though money need not change hands that insurance relationship is
nonetheless economic.
8 Such relationships with a group much smaller than the state government
must have been ubiquitous historically. They survive in the West in the form of radical religious
sects like Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Christian Anabaptists (such as Hutterites and Mennonites)
who provide extremely high levels of community mutual aid to members.
An efficient market economy and a functioning secular state are both threats to these
affiliations as they reduce the need for the services which these groups provide and reduce the
nonmarket hours available to members to provide services to others. Like Radical Islam, radical
Christian and Jewish sects often seek to distance members from market economies.5
9 Rashid (2000), and Davis (1999) describe the Afghan civil war and the rise of the Taliban.
10 In 1978 a Marxist coup from within the army overthrew a Soviet backed government. Rural tribes
declared a holy war against the coup leadership. A violent power struggle within the coup culminated in the
assassination of the new President and in the Soviet invasion of December 1979. Over the next ten years the
Mujaheddin conducted a successful guerrilla war which eventually forced a Soviet retreat, despite a $45B military
effort. The Mujahheddin received about $10B in military support, mostly from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, in an
effort largely administered by Pakistani intelligence (ISI). (Cost figures from Huntington [1996]).
11 The Soviet-backed president was overthrown in 1992 when Kabul, the capital, fell to an alliance of
Mujaheddin from northern Afghani Tajik and Uzbek tribes. This set off a bloody internal war with a coalition of
Pashtun tribes over Kabul, which had been under Pashtun control for 300 years. In 1994 General Dostum, leader of
the northern Uzbeks, defected to join these Pashtun and their leader,  Hikmetyar. Yet even with Pakistani backing
Hikmetyar could not seize Kabul.
Taliban
Afghanistan is a famously ungovernable country which has suffered 23 years of civil war at an
appalling cost of one and a half million lives.
9 
10 The Mujaheddin, a loose tribe-based alliance of
Islamic militants conducted a successful insurgency which eventually expelled a Soviet
occupation. They had U.S. and Saudi aid, administered by Pakistani intelligence (ISI).  Those
subsidies were remarkably effective in expelling the Soviets, but radicalized Afghani society
“Prior to the war the Islamicists barely had a base in Afghan society, but with money and
arms from the CIA pipeline and support from Pakistan, they built one and wielded
tremendous clout.” [Rashid (2000), p. 19].
By the mid 1990s, the Pashtun south had collapsed economically.
11 It was run by former
Mujaheddin warlords in warring fiefdoms ranging in size from a few provinces to single villages.
During this particularly chaotic period, the Taliban emerged in Kandahar, the largest city in the
Pashtun south. Rashid (2000) emphasizes economic factors contributing to their formation.
“International aid agencies were fearful of even working in Kandahar as the city itself
was divided by warring groups. Their leaders sold off everything to Pakistani traders to
make money, stripping down telephone wires and poles, cutting trees, selling off
factories, machinery and even road rollers to scrap merchants. The warlords seized
homes and farms, threw out their occupants and handed them over to their supporters.
The commanders abused the population at will, kidnaping young girls and boys for their
sexual pleasure, robbing merchants in the bazaars and fighting and brawling in the
streets.” [Rashid, (2000), p. 21]
Banditry on the roads was an expensive obstacle for smugglers. Truckers based in the
Pakistani border city of Quetta had a long tradition smuggling goods through Afghanistan to
Iran, Turkmenistan and the rest of Central Asia. Their route from Quetta passed north through
Kandahar then west through the Afghan city of Herat, which was controlled by the militia of
Ismael Khan. With alternate routes in northern Afghanistan blocked by heavy fighting, this route
seemed the best chance for trade from Pakistan to Iran and Turkmenistan and on into Turkey. By6
12 Rashid (2000) reports that In October 1994 Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto met with Ismael Khan of
Herat and Uzbek warlord General Dostum, to negotiate a secure route (p. 27). Davis (1999), relying on several
sources, also emphasizes the role of Pakistani economic interests in the formation of the Taliban.
13 The Taliban’s version of their movements’ birth stresses not safe roads but public safety of another kind.
They claim to have been a group of seminary students, led by Mullah Omar, a Mujahhedin veteran, who were
enlisted by the local population to prevent the rape of teenage girls and boys by warlords. 
14 Rashid 2000, p. 35.
the fall of 1994 the Pakistani government backed an effort by the ISI to reconstruct roads and
create alliances along the Kandahar-Herat route.
12 
In October 1994 the ISI sent a trial convoy loaded with medicine from Quetta to
Ashkabad, in Turkmenistan. When the convoy was held up by warlords south of Kandahar, a
small, largely unknown group of radical Islamists, the Taliban, conveniently emerged to free it.
The Taliban were well-armed with rifles, mortars, ammunition and vehicles they had ostensibly
acquired by raiding an ammunition dump two weeks earlier on the Pakistani border.  By
December the Taliban were operating a safe single-toll road through the Kandahar region.
Precisely what the Kandahar warlords had previously failed to offer the ISI. Convoys safely
passed from Turkmenistan to Quetta and back for the first time in years. 
The same evening the convoy was liberated, those few hundred Taliban captured
Kandahar with minimal casualties. The second biggest city in Afghanistan was taken by simply
bribing the local warlords to surrender. By December they had recruited 12,000 students from
the religious schools of the radical Islamic Juma’at al Islamiya (JUI) of Pakistan, mostly from
Afghan refugee families. Within three months the Taliban had efficiently conquered 12 of 31
provinces of Afghanistan, largely through a series of Coasian bargains with local warlords. They
collected arms, imposed law and order, and opened roads.
13 The resulting increase in commerce
immediately lowered the price of food.
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The rest of the story is familiar: The Taliban proceeded to conquer and control some 90%
of Afghanistan, a feat unmatched by the Soviet Union. Smuggling prospered so much that it
caused a $400m drop in Pakistani customs revenue between 1993 and 1997. (Rashid, p. 192).
The Taliban protected most of the $1B Afghan-Pakistani drug trade. Their control was so
complete that they could eventually ban the cultivation of opium in 2000. (Note that the Taliban
banned cultivation but allowed trade in opium and heroin to continue.)
The puzzle of gratuitous destruction
Beyond effectively providing law and order the Taliban instituted a set of extreme policies so
destructive that they challenge the notion of rational choice:
“The Taliban immediately implemented the strictest interpretation of Sharia law ever
seen in the Muslim world. They closed down girls’ schools and banned women from
working outside the home, smashed TV sets, forbade a whole array of sports and
recreational activities and ordered all males to grow long beards.” (Rashid, p. 30.)7
15 Armstrong (2000) provides a clear account of the history of the Society of Muslim Brotherhood.
16 This interpretation of the religious requirement of Jihad is controversial. Jihad can also mean simply a
personal struggle for piety, self-improvement and the service of others (Esposito, 2002, p. 27).
These practices are inconsistent with traditional Islam. Mohammed is known for emancipating
women. They were also much more extreme than restrictions imposed on women in the
Taliban’s home communities in the Pashtun region around Kandahar.
The subjugation of women and non-Taliban worsened as they amassed power and moved
into regions outside the Pashtun south. In the major cities of Kabul and Herat, norms and Sharia
law were enforced with outrageous aggressiveness –women were beaten for wearing shoes that
squeaked. Foreign aid workers were bullied into leaving, causing a shutdown of schools, clinics
and humanitarian aid. Why would a movement trying to further a religious agenda among
Muslims distance those same Muslims by abusing them?
Of all the allies that the ISI could have (and did) chose, why is it that the group with the
most extreme religious practices was the most efficient at securing the safety of convoys and
ordinary people, and at conquering and controlling Afghanistan?
Hamas
Just as the Taliban militia are an offshoot of the nonviolent JUI, the Hamas is a direct
descendant of the Muslim Brotherhood, the first modern radical religious movement in Islam.
15
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928 with the aim of
reinvigorating Islam through individual piety and self-improvement, fighting the insidious force
of assimilation into materialist Western culture, and the establishment of an Islamic state.
Members met weekly in small groups, reinforcing a set of basic prohibitions on gambling,
alcohol, adultery and usury.  The Brotherhood established a broad network of mosques, boys and
girls schools, youth groups, clinics, hospitals, charities, trade unions, night schools for workers,
and even factories. These enjoyed considerable public support both as a social service provider
and as a focus of religious and political expression.
In 1948 a splinter terrorist organization of the Brotherhood, the “Secret Apparatus,” (al-
Jihaz al sirri) carried out a campaign of bombing and political assassination, including the
assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister. The government subsequently suppressed the
Brotherhood. Al-Banna was shot in the street, apparently by a government agent. Since then the
Muslim Brotherhood has been an illegal but tolerated force in Egyptian society and politics,
sometimes courted by government but often suppressed. In the 1950s an imprisoned member,
Sayyid Qutb, developed the militant ideology of radical Islam. He preached that religious
communities could only survive if segregated from secular culture. Moreover, Qutb preached
that violent revolt was a religious duty, both against the secular West and against the secular
government of Egypt.
16 His call to violence broke sharply with traditional Muslim theology,8
17 See Armstrong (2000), pp. 241-243. Qutb and his supporters argue that Islam is under siege so that
violent revolt is an act of self-defense. I thank Timur Kuran for pointing this out.
18 Mishal and Sela (2000), Juergensmeyer (2000), p. 78.
19 Armstrong (2000), p. 351. The Hamas would eventually have a leadership in exile in the U.S. which
raised funds among the Palestinian diaspora as well. The Israel Security Agency estimated foreign support at about
one million dollars per month in the Spring of 2003, following international pressure on donors to stop that support.
“Only a fraction” of those funds go to the military wing (ISA director Avi Dichter, Ha’Aretz, July 4, 2003).
20 Schiff and Ya’ari (1989).
21 The Lebanese Shi’ite organization Amal similarly insulated itself from reprisal by establishing Hizbullah
as a separate entity.
which is tolerant of other cultures, permits warfare only in self-defense and rejects violence in
religious matters.
17
Branches of the Muslim Brotherhood appeared in the Gaza and the West Bank in the
1950s. In 1971 Sheikh Ahmed Yassin founded an affiliated organization called Congress
(Mujamah) in Gaza. Muslims in the West Bank and Gaza were relatively secular at the time, but
Sheikh Yassin soon gained popular support for his movement by establishing a social service
network of medical clinics, schools, charities, support for orphans, drug treatment centers, youth
clubs, sports clubs and mosques.
18 The Congress filled gaps in the social services provided by
the Israeli occupational government, charities and international organizations, especially among
refugees. Congress was financed by tithing (zakat) and by support from Arabs abroad.
19
Yassin’s Congress shared Al-Banna’s agenda: personal ethical conduct, personal piety
and the eventual establishment of a local Islamic government. In contrast to their secular rival,
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Brothers saw the liberation of Palestine as a
long term goal to be deferred till ethical conduct and local Islamic government were established.
The Brothers were nonviolent, except for some skirmishes with PLO supporters. They
contributed to an increase in religious practice in the 1980s in the West Bank and Gaza: dress
codes were more stringently observed and outward signs of piety increased, including the
frequency of prayer. The increased stringency of practice was especially evident in Gaza which
is poorer and where the Brothers have more support and institutions.
Hamas was founded in1988 as a result of the first Palestinian Intifada, a spontaneous
revolt against Israeli occupation, led by neither the PLO nor the Brothers.
20 SheikhYassin’s local
organizers urged him to endorse the revolt and establish a militia, lest the Brothers lose popular
support to the local leadership of the PLO, which was harnessing the outburst of nationalism.
Yassin initially resisted but eventually agreed to establishing an affiliated secret militia, the
Hamas, carefully separating it from the Congress to protect the Brotherhood’s social service
institutions from reprisal.
219
22 Berman and Laitin (2003). 
23 That boycott failed in 1988 though the goal was later indirectly achieved.  Attacks led Israel to replace
Palestinians with foreign laborers in the 1990s and to severely restrict their access to Israeli labor markets in 2001. 
The Hamas immediately began printing leaflets calling for violent opposition to the
Israeli occupation. It underwent an ideological shift, adopting a nationalist position more
extreme than that of the PLO, making the immediate conquest of all of Palestine (as opposed to
just the West Bank and Gaza) a religious obligation. This was an expensive change in ideology,
as it predictably provoked a campaign of arrest and suppression by the Israeli army which put
members at high risk of arrest. That ideological shift would eventually also put members at risk
of arrest and reprisal by the PLO after the Oslo accords.
The Hamas soon became a singularly effective militia: hard to penetrate, disciplined,
adequately funded, well trained and committed. Members regularly risked arrest and endangered
their lives by confronting soldiers, assassinating collaborators, organizing and carrying out
terrorist attacks. Hamas suicide bombings of buses in Israel in 1996 delivered a close Israeli
election to the right wing Likud party, critically injuring the Oslo process which Hamas opposed.
To this day Hamas boasts the highest proportion of suicide bombers who carry out their
objective or at least die trying. Their attacks are also the most deadly among Palestinian terrorist
groups.
22
Besides their remarkable agenda shift and their effectiveness as a militia, the Hamas also
present a third puzzle: a tendency to make increasing demands of members and to inflict
gratuitous punishment on nonmembers which is puzzling for a populist movement. Beginning
with the first Intifada, they forced a poor population to adhere to general strikes of commercial
activity which prevented Palestinians from shopping, doing business and sometimes even from
working. They even attempted a boycott on all work for Israelis, which would have resulted in
sacrificing perhaps a quarter of Palestinian GNP.
23 They worked to cripple a peace process that
was returning occupied territory to Palestinian control because the process represented in their
view collaboration with the conquerors of Palestine in 1948, precisely the opposite of the patient
ideology of the pre-1988 Muslim Brotherhood. 
Taliban and Hamas
To summarize, the Taliban and Hamas are both radical Islamic groups that turned violent. While
their geographical and theological origins are distinct, they share several functional
characteristics which suggest investigating their behavior in parallel, as summarized in Table I.
Both movements arose in environments with weak local government and responded by providing
a local public good. Both are militias that formed as affiliates of venerable nonviolent radical
Islamic organizations, the Hamas from the Islamic Brotherhood and the Taliban from the Jamiat-
e-Ulema-Islam (JUI) in Pakistan. Both received generous subsidies from abroad, either for
ideological reasons or in return for services. Both underwent increases in stringency of practice
as they gained power. Younger members undergo some costly initiation rite of personal sacrifice10
24 Much of this discussion in this section draws on Berman [2000], which describes prohibitions and
sacrifices among Ultra-Orthodox Jews in more detail.
25 Iannaccone [1998] describes the growth of conservative sects worldwide (p. 1471).
in each group. Both groups changed their ideologies drastically and at great cost to members.
Both developed into militias which produced local public goods using violence. These
similarities should not be overstated. One difference is that the Hamas view most Palestinians as
potential members while the Taliban seem to see most Afghans as a conquered people.
While this paper limits itself to the Taliban, Hamas and Jewish Underground (below)
whose evolution is recent and relatively well documented, that general set of characteristics may
well be shared by other religious militias, a point we return to below. Concentrating on the
functional characteristics of these groups avoids a discussion of their legitimacy as religious or
national liberation movements. (The economic model has nothing to add to a discussion of
legitimacy.)
III. EFFICIENT PROHIBITIONS AND SACRIFICE
24
Prohibitions and sacrifices among religious groups in general
Before tackling the puzzles of radical religious groups and their militias, even mainstream
religious groups constitute a puzzle for rational choice theory: these groups prohibit common
pleasurable behaviors and require sacrifices. Prohibitions include dietary restrictions, Sabbath
observance, dress codes, head shaving, fidelity, driving licenses, restriction of sexual practices
and refusal of medical care, for instance. Sacrifices are irreversible destruction of resources, such
as burnt offerings. In the recent history of European Jewry, a circumcision irreversibly labeled a
child as Jewish, an act that might put his life at risk by destroying the option of pretending to be
a gentile. A vow of fidelity or abstinence is also a form of sacrifice, since it represents a
permanent restriction of activities. Years of volunteer activity required of Mormons can be
though of as a sacrifice of time, especially considering the foregone opportunity to accumulate
human capital. Years of study in a religious institution represent a sacrifice of the alternative
potential use of that time, be it in accumulation of human capital in secular studies or in
accumulation of earnings.
Limiting choices and destroying resources is puzzling to an economist, yet people
voluntarily join groups which enforce prohibitions and require sacrifices. These groups
stubbornly defy price theory, persisting in time-intensive activities like communal worship,
Sabbath observance and dietary restrictions despite the historical increase in the shadow price of
time. Strict sects show no sign of disappearing and those with the most demanding practices
seem to be growing fastest.
25  The modern Anabaptist traditions (such as the Amish, Mennonites11
26 Revealingly, the Hebrew term for Ultra-Orthodox, Haredi, literally means “shaker” impling trembling
before the Almighty, the same way the Shakers used the term.
and Hutterites) are holding their own while Ultra-Orthodox
26 Jewry, and Radical Islam are
thriving, despite a multitude of time intensive requirements.
Iannaccone (1992) offered a creative solution to the puzzles of prohibitions and
sacrifices, proposing that they are efficient institutions in the context of an economic club which
provides services to members. This section presents a simplified version of his argument,
discussing prohibitions and then sacrifices. Section IV extends the argument to cover militia
activity.
Efficient Prohibitions 
A social interaction model offers an explanation. Group members derive utility from (secular)
consumption, S, and from time spent in religious activities, R, such as prayer and community
service. They also gain utility from the level of a local public good A.
Good A is nonrival and excludable, making it a club good. Members get A from either a
government, G, or the “club,” C, which uses hours of religious activity as an input. Public safety
is an example of a pure public good which could be provided by government or by a club,
perhaps as a religious obligation. Welfare services, schools, hospitals and mutual insurance are
examples of excludable, partially rival activities commonly provided by religious communities.
 
Members maximize utility subject to time and budget constraints. A fixed allocation of
time, T, is split between the religious activity, R,  and work hours, H,
Income is earned from wages w and spent on consumption of the secular good, S, at price p, 
A key point is that the club good C is produced by voluntary donation of time by members.
These donations are extremely common in religious sects. Since that voluntary activity generates
positive externalities, competitive equilibrium will result in too little religious activity R, as
illustrated in Figure 1. The labor supply curve to the right indicates the competitive equilibrium
choice of work hours, H=T-R, at the wage w/p. The curve to the left indicates the efficient labor12
27The level of A serves to amplify the labor supply elasticity in the upward-sloping segment of the labor
supply curve (Figure I) if R and A are complements. A change in wages has both the conventional direct effect on
leisure (hours worked) and an indirect effect in the same direction through its effect on A. This is the “social
multiplier” effect emphasized by Becker and Murphy [2000].
28 A community with tax authority would subsidize Ri, or tax the alternative use of time, Hi. Religious
groups often encourage R with eternal promises and the respect of one’s peers. Yet R may be hard to subsidize if it is
unobservable, like anonymous charity. Alternatively, consider a community that can literally control the price level
faced by members through a tax. To achieve the social welfare optimum they would lower the real wage by
imposing a tax  J = p* - p, which induces a choice of  R* > R.
Fig 1: Optimal Taxation Through Prohibition
supply schedule that a social planner would choose. She would prefer less work and more
religious activity (at R*).
27
The competitive equilibrium choice
of R ignores the last term, which
reflects the positive externality.
A community without tax
authority
28 could achieve the optimal
level of religious activity (R*) by
imposing and enforcing prohibitions
on types of secular consumption,
thus inducing members to work less
and spend more time at religious
activities. One of Iannaccone’s key
insights is that religious prohibitions
can be rationalized as extreme but
enforceable forms of taxation on
secular activity.  Individuals will voluntarily join a club which requires prohibitions. if the extra
club good produced with the additional hours, Nx(R*-R),  is sufficiently valuable. More
generally, contact with the secular world substitutes for club activities. Thus prohibitions that
limit these outside contacts induce members to spend more time in religious and other club
activities that have positive externalities. Exclusion from access to the local public good C  is a
common, viable form of enforcement.
This argument can rationalize many forms of religious prohibition. For example, dietary
restrictions increase the cost of market provision of food, while decreasing the ability of group
members to socialize with nonmembers. Sabbath restrictions remove one’s ability to driving to
the mall and consume,  inducing members to spend time together on the Sabbath instead, and so13
29 The logic is similar to an argument for the efficiency of restrictions placed by landowner/lenders on the
access of sharecroppers to outside sources of credit. Limiting outside opportunities can preserve incentive
compatibility in the presence of moral hazard or enforcement constraints (Ghosh, Mookherjee and Ray, 2000).
30 While it could be efficient for each club, mutual antagonism may endanger innocent bystanders.
31 This is a simplified form of Iannaccone’s [1992] model.
forth.
29 This also explains the attraction of dress codes, which aid enforcement by making
community members readily identifiable. As in the military, being caught out of uniform triggers
sanctions.
Adam Smith [1776] used the term “sect” to describe 18
th century Christian religious
groups with strict practices. Sociologists use that term for groups that place strong restrictions on
secular activities [Weber 1946, 1978]. Smith could just as well have been describing the birth of
Ultra-Orthodoxy in the late 18
th century, or that of radical Islam in the early 20
th.
Friction between club members and nonmembers resulting from a club’s political agenda,
for instance, may cause antagonism toward club members. That antagonism can be desirable and
efficient for the club if it discourages outside activity by members. It provides another
mechanism to induce higher levels of religious activity by reducing outside options. In that sense




Rationalizing prohibitions is important in understanding how radical religious sects operate, but
our insights into militias will really flow from understanding sacrifices. Sacrifices are acts which
irreversibly destroy value, like circumcision, burnt offerings, and ritual bloodletting. These
cannot be rationalized as efficient prohibitions using the argument above since they do not tax a
secular activity. They can be explained as an initiation rite which signals type [Camerer 1988,
Iannaccone 1992]. 
To see how the model
31 explains sacrifices, augment it with unobserved heterogeneity in
the form of  high wage (type 2) and low wage (type 1) individuals. High wage individuals
choose less religious activity as it is relatively more expensive for them, i.e., R
2 < R
1. 
(Heterogeneity could alternatively be in both preference for religious activities at the margin and
wages. Heterogeneity in wages alone is chosen mainly to simplify the exposition.) Assume that
the value of the club good is given by the average of R, as would plausibly be the case in a
mutual insurance club, where the average donation of time by members to mutual aid would
matter.
High wage - low R individuals are potential “free-riders.” They would like to join the
high  R club and benefit from their high average level of religious activity. Members of the high14
32 For a formal derivation see Appendix 1 in Berman (2000). Figure 2 is constructed by simulation using the
function U(S,R,A) = [S$ + (R"A
(1-"))$]
/$).
Figure 2. Efficient Sacrifice
R (low wage) club would rather not admit the high wage types, as the reduction in the average
level of religious activity will reduce club quality. Since access to the externality is excludable,
the high R (low wage) group can rid their club of free riders problem by requiring a costly
initiation rite, or sacrifice, which will successfully exclude low R (high wage) individuals from
joining, keeping C high,
at C=R
1. Unlike
religious activity, R, the
sacrifice benefits no one
except through its role as
a signal. Potential
applicants are forced to
reveal their type, which
is otherwise
unobservable, when they
make a decision to
sacrifice, or not to
sacrifice, time.
The gain to a
club from requiring a
sacrifice is illustrated in
Figure 2.
32 The
horizontal axis shows the
allocation of time between work hours, religious activity and sacrifice. The vertical axis
measures utility. The two higher curves represent the utility of high wage types and the two
lower curves the utility of low wage types. High wage types in a low C environment choose
point A2. Low wage types in a low C environment choose A1 at a higher level of R than high
wage types. Low wage types improve their outcome by establishing a club which admits only
members who sacrifice an amount of time 6*. By excluding high wage types they achieve the
higher level of utility at B1, where the sacrifice of time is more than compensated by higher level
of local public good C(R
1). 
A sacrifice inducing only low wage types to sacrifice is a separating equilibrium. The
efficient sacrifice is the smallest 6 that induces separation, leaving high wage types indifferent
between the high C(R
1) and sacrifice (B2), and the low C(R
2) without sacrifice (A2). The low
wage, high R group is better off with the institution of a sacrifice and will accept anyone who
makes the sacrifice into the group, since a sacrifice reliably signals a high level of religious
activity. This setup is analogous to other forms of costly sacrifices which signal type, such as
initiation rites in the military, hazing in fraternities, Spence signaling in schooling, or frivolous
engagement gifts.15
Applying this model to the behavior of radical Islamic groups yields some immediate
insights. It allows us to rationalize the common Taliban practice of years of attendance in
religious seminaries which offer little or no training in marketable skills. While indulging in the
study of holy texts might not be surprising as a leisure activity for relatively wealthy individuals,
it is a puzzling choice for impoverished Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Yet as a sacrifice of time
which allows access to a desirable club, that behavior may be quite sensible.
The puzzling sacrifice among the Hamas is of a different nature. Members show a
surprising willingness to risk arrest by organizing and conducting low level violent activity.
Since arrest often implies protracted jail terms, this activity can also be understood as a sacrifice
of time. Suicidal acts are not viewed as a sacrifice in this context. They are discussed briefly in
the next section but are treated more completely in a companion paper (Berman and Laitin,
2003).
An extension of this model shows that subsidies to a club can induce extreme increases in
sacrifice. Intuitively, if the subsidy augments the benefits of membership, the queue of potential
free riders lengthens and a larger sacrifice is required to distinguish committed (low wage) from
uncommitted (high wage) types. In the extreme case a subsidy can make club members worse off
as the increased sacrifice outweighs the augmented benefits of membership. For details see
Berman (2000). For the Taliban, such a subsidy could come in the form of transfers from their
sponsors, Pakistani intelligence and Bin Laden or from increased revenues from controlling
smuggling and the drug trade. For Hamas outside subsidies come mostly from the Gulf states
and from the Palestinian diaspora. In both cases, subsidies exacerbate the free-rider problem by
making the club more attractive, which in turn create a requirement for a more extreme signal of
commitment, such as acts that trigger even longer jail sentences.16
33 Violence is not an inherent feature of rent-seeking activities. It is more a symptom of the lack of a
government which prevents negative sum activities such as violence. Terrorism, discussed below, is an extreme case.
Figure 3: Securing a Trade Route
IV MILITIAS
Why do radical religious groups so often create militias and why are those militias so effective?
Define militia activity as co-ordinated capture of rents involving violence.
33  Attacking an
occupying army, providing law and order, organizing and carrying out clandestine activity (such
as terrorism) are examples. This activity often involves personal risk. A key aspect of militia
activity is its sensitivity to defection. This section argues that religious sects have an advantage
in militia activity because the signaling mechanisms adopted for the provision of other public
goods allow them to select members unlikely to defect in a militia.
Securing a Trade Route
Consider a standard assignment in the imposition of law and order, securing a trade route.
Imagine a road with N checkpoints at which a convoy can easily be robbed, perhaps from
Pakistan to Turkmenistan on the Kandahar-Herat route. The convoy is worth B at the last stop
but worth nothing at the first, to emphasize returns from trade. 
A club member at each checkpoint allocates time to either R or H. Ri + Hi = 1 and Ri is
binary. Member i can either “defect”(Ri = 0)  and steal B or remain “loyal” (Ri = 1) and protect
B. The public good technology is 
(4)   ,  CR i C R i
i
N
({ }) ( ) =
= ∏
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where C(1) is the value of a safe road and C(0) is that of an unsafe road, so that C(1) > C(0).
This multiplicative technology for joint production differs from the club’s technology for
producing benign local public goods, which averaged the Ri , in equation (3).
A convoy will choose to set out only if all Ri equal 1, which is to say each member
remained loyal. In that case the convoy reaches the last stop and the club extracts the entire
surplus B which it shares equally among members, each receiving B/NP. If member i defects he
would keep the entire surplus B, loses access to the safe road (the public good C) as punishment,17
Figure 4: Low Wage Membership Allows Larger Projects
but earns the outside option wage wi > 0. That member will remain “loyal” if the following
incentive compatibility constraint holds:
.
Taking the terms in the utility function in order, a loyal member has lower consumption than a
defector (B/NP < (B+w)/P) but gains the direct utility from doing his (religious) duty (R=1) and
has access to more of the local public good since G+C(1) > G.
If incentive compatibility fails, the result is an N player prisoner’s dilemma, implying an
unsafe trade route, no convoy and no rents to extract.
Now consider heterogeneity and adverse selection. Assume two unobserved types, high
wage and low wage (as above) and assume parameter values such that low wage types remain
loyal and high wage types defect. (I.e., there exists a w’ such that w
L   <  w’ < w
H and incentive
compatibility in (5) holds only if wi < w’.) A club with a costly sacrifice as an initiation rite
which successfully excludes all high wage types can consistently secure the trade route and
extract the rent, B. A militia that cannot exclude high wage types will fail to secure the route.
Figure 4 illustrates how the maximum project value B is higher for militias who can
exclude high wage members. Militias prefer lower wage members because they are less prone to
defection. The Figure graphs utility against project values for both defectors and loyal members.18
34 The model is presented as static for simplicity. A more realistic dynamic version, under standard
assumptions, would give a similar incentive compatibility constraint: Assume an infinite horizon, with a time-
consistent club strategy of never forgiving defection, and a defector smoothing consumption by consuming rB + wi
each period for some rate of interest r>0. In a stationary equilibrium the future for a loyal member always looks the
same, and the incentive compatibility constraint is just like (5) but with ‘rB + wi’  replacing ‘B + wi’  on the right
hand side. The results in the rest of the paper for the static case follow as long as r>1/N. The only clear insight the
dynamics yields is that high r and high N weaken incentive compatibility (good investment opportunities, longer
expected lifetimes). Time inconsistency by the club may also weaken incentive compatibility through the prospect of
future forgiveness.
Since loyal members (Ri = 1) earn no wages, their utility is unaffected by their wages. High
wage defectors have higher utility than low wage defectors at all project values. In the interval
(B*, B**) high wage members will defect while low wage members will remain loyal. This
could explain the advantage of building a militia of young men with little labor market
experience who were educated in the Maddraseh of Afghan refugee camps, rather than choosing
combat veterans from among former Mujahhedin. It may also explain why, once formed, the
Taliban were such a successful militia.
34
In Afghanistan, this approach resolves the puzzle of how the inexperienced Taliban
successfully secured trade routes for Pakistani interests while combat-hardened warlords and
former Mujaheddin could not. Groups less adept at extracting signals of commitment (sacrifices)
may not be able to consistently enforce incentive compatibility. The more radical the religious
group in its norms of sacrifice, the tighter lower the effective outside wages of members and the
more capable it is of imposing public order in the face of possible defection by members.
The multiplicative technology in (4) generally describes a wide variety of militia
activities in which success is critically dependent on the loyalty of all members. Moreover, in
cases where members endanger themselves, survival may depend on the loyalty of others.
Consider two further examples of militia activities: co-ordinated assaults and clandestine attacks.19
35 Considering the danger involved, we could relax the zero-sum assumption and allow the victim to lose
more than B from an assault. That only worsens the defection problem as the victim will be willing to pay more than
B to a defector.
Figure 5: Capturing a Hill
Co-ordinated Assault
Another example of militia activity relevant for Afghanistan is co-ordinated assault. Here
soldiers (or units) attack some target by alternating between advancing and providing cover fire.
A defection by the unit providing cover fire leaves other units exposed to fire from the target,
causing the assault to fail. 
Assume that
the target is worth B,
both to the attacker
and to the potential
victim. Assume also
that B can be divided
as income among
attackers (as would
literally be the case for
mercenaries). The
potential victim will
be willing to pay up to
B to induce defection.
In Afghanistan there
was a going rate to
buy defections of this
type. A successful
assault is a club
“good” to members, perhaps because it rids them of some occupying enemy, enhancing their
quality of life. The analysis is then formally identical to the trade route case above, with militia
production described by equation (4), the same payoff structure and an assault succeeding only if
the incentive compatibility constraint (5) holds.
35 If (5) fails, no assault is carried out and no rent
is captured.
This approach can explain the remarkable fact that the Taliban was more successful at
conquering Afghanistan than more experienced, larger, but less radically Islamic former
Mujaheddin. It was easier to ensure the commitment of Taliban members because their extreme
version of religious practice had signaled very limited outside opportunities wi .  
As an aside, this club approach may also explain the ascendancy of the Mujaheddin as an
effective force in expelling the Soviets in the 1980s and early 1990s. While their religious
practices were less extreme than those of the Taliban, they were much more extreme than those
of the warlords who preceded them, who were not religious radicals.20
Figure 5: Terrorism
Guerrillas and Terrorists
Clandestine militias such as guerrillas and terrorists also share the multiplicative technology in
(4). Consider an attack on some target where the potential victim can induce defection at any
stage in the process, from planning through til the attack. Any of N conspirators, including
planners, can defect or remain loyal. (This may be a negative-sum activity as the replacement
value of the damage to the victim, D, may far exceed the value to conspirators, B, so that B<D,
even if B(D) is an increasing function.) 
Assume that the N conspirators have nonrival benefit  B from a successful attack.
Assume also that conspirators have income from some outside sponsor (who values B). That
income is small but proportional to D, "D, where 0<"<1. Assume for simplicity that a defector
can extract the entire surplus, D, from the potential victim. In this case the incentive
compatibility constraint for an individual member is 
. 
As in the other examples of militia activities, a member remains loyal if the intrinsic value of
doing his duty (R=1), and the benefit of the extra local public good, B+C( ), are sufficient R
compensation for the foregone income ((D+w)/P - "D/NP) available to defectors. We assume
that in this case the club is producing two local public goods. It uses the violent local public
good production function in (4) to produce B and the benign local public good production
function to produce C.
Now consider again heterogeneity in outside options, w. Assume parameters are such that
members with good outside options will defect while low wage types will not, (i.e., there is some
cutoff wage w’ below which (6) will hold and w
L   <  w’ < w
H ). A club with the capacity to
extract signals of commitment (low wages) can implement the clandestine attack technology21
36 The figures are simulated using utility function U(S, R, A) = ( S$ R$A$ )
1/$ , $ = 1/3.
Figure 7: Benign Activity Increases a Militia’s Potential 
(equation (4)) while other prospective militias cannot. This interpretation may explain why
Hamas quickly became so effective at terrorist attacks, even without the experience of older
groups with similar ideologies such as the Islamic Jihad. 
Conspiracies evoke the painful topic of suicide attacks. Rationalizing the choices of
terrorists on suicide missions is beyond the scope of this paper, and is discussed in Berman and
Laitin (2003). In this context, though, it is worth pointing out that from the point of view of the
controller suicide attacks are a particularly effective method of protecting conspirators, since the
perpetrator cannot reveal information after the fact, removing a dimension of potential defection.
Comparative Statics
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between the utility of defectors, the utility of loyal members
and the value, B, of the convoy or target. Label B the “project value” to generally describe the
rent captured by various types of militia activities. If members sufficiently value the benefits of
the club good and of the religious activity then at low project values it is easy to construct
parameter values such that loyalty dominates defection.













increase in the value






Intuitively, a member who was on the margin of being bribed into defection at B* will be
induced to remain loyal by the attraction of an increased value of the club good. A much larger
potential bribe, B**, is now required to induce defection. Augmenting the club good may
increase militia activity in two ways. First, for a given B in the range between B* and B**,
loyalty can be induced in equation (5) (or (6)) where it was previously absent, allowing rent22
37 Prestige could have the very concrete interpretation of preferred access to local public goods.
Figure 8: Government Provision of Public Goods
 Reduces Militia Activity
extraction (in the convoy example) to increase from zero to B. Second, if the club can choose
which projects to undertake, (i.e., convoys to allow on the road, hills to capture, targets to attack)
it can now expand its range of feasible projects from (0,B*) to (0,B**), capturing larger rents.
Thus clubs that are more productive at a benign club activity can exploit the induced
cohesiveness by allowing themselves more militia activity in the sense of a higher project value
B. In this way efficient provision of nonviolent club goods, such as health care, mutual insurance
or educational services, complements the ability of these same clubs to function as militias. This
may explain why Hamas is a more effective militia than Islamic Jihad which has a similar
religious/national ideology, and much more experience at violent activity but provides less of the
benign club goods.
The Figure also illustrates the effects of subsidies to clubs. A subsidy which augments C
or which provides cash payments to members can induce a discrete increase in militia activity
for project values in the (B*, B*’) range. This may explain why even relatively small cash
payments to families of suicide bombers, or small increases in the prestige that the public
rewards those families with,
37 can induce large increases in co-ordinated militia activity. 
In contrast, the model predicts that increased provision of public goods by government
will reduce militia activity. The mechanism is illustrated in Figure 8:  Since the utility function
exhibits diminishing marginal returns to public goods, increases in government provision of the
public good G makes
potential defectors
less desperate for the
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B*  to B**.23
In this context it is important to clearly define what we mean by government. In this
model a government provides public good G to both club members and to nonmembers without
discrimination. Subsidies which increase C increase militia activity by reinforcing incentive
compatibility (club loyalty) and increasing B, the club’s maximum feasible project.  In contrast,
subsidies to G, public goods accessible by both member and nonmembers, reduce militia activity
since they improve the outside options of potential defectors, should they leave the club.
This policy prescription, improving public services to limit the influence of clubs, is
actually not novel. It  restates a proposal made by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations. In his
discussion of Church and State he recalls religious violence in Europe and is concerned with the
influence of 18
th century religious sects. He proposed that secular “gaiety” be subsidized in order
to undermine the influence of sects with “disagreeably strict” moral codes.
Note that the only important characteristic of government in provision of local public
goods is that G be provided without discrimination to both club members and to nonmembers.
Local public goods provided by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or foreign governments
would also reduce the strength of militias as they do not favor club members. Symmetrically, a
government that discriminates in provision of local public goods can in effect create loyal and
less-loyal subpopulations, creating a potential advantage in organizing a militia among the loyal.
The comparative statics of equations (5) and (6), as illustrated in Figures 4, 7 and 8, can
be summarized as follows: The maximum incentive compatible level of the target B* increases
in the value of the club good C(1), and in the price level P; it decreases in the members’ wage,
wi, in the level of government services G, and in N, the number of members sharing B.24
38 Note the inconsistency with mainstream Islamic tradition. One of the Prophet Mohammed’s first goals
was to emancipate women.
Policy Options for Militias
To the extent that a club can manipulate parameter values, it will aspire to efficiently increase its
militia activity through both constructive and destructive acts.
Constructive Efficiency: 
1) raising C(1), through some other investment that augment club goods (welfare, hospitals,
etc.), 
2) making cash payments to members, (payments to families of martyrs), 
3) investing in a technology to provide the club good with a lower number of participants, N.
Destructive Efficiency:
4) lowering wi, the outside options of members, (Madrasseh, jail time, secluding women,
harassing nonmembers, destroying or banning access to Israeli labor markets), 
5) limiting B to keep it in the feasible range (ban on heroin cultivation), 
6) reducing G, the public good available to members and nonmembers, (expulsion of NGOs
providing humanitarian aid, closing schools and hospitals, assassination of judges and public
officials),
7) raising P (general strikes, access to goods markets).
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the club’s incentives is that it is not only efficient
for members to be self-destructive, it is even efficient for them to destroy the utility of 
nonmembers. The clearest mechanism is through the destruction of G. The explanation is the
converse of the argument illustrated in Figure 8. At a lower general level of government services
for nonmembers, potential defectors value the club good more at the margin, making them less
likely to defect. That logic can explain the assassination of judges and public officials in Egypt
by the Muslim Brotherhood, and harassment of humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan by the
Taliban.
A subtler mechanism by which the club benefits from damage to nonmembers is through
its’ effect in reducing outside options, wi.  The most difficult acts to rationalize by the Taliban
are those that appear to be gratuitously destructive. One might expect that a religious
organization intent on instituting a government based on ethical practices would attempt to make
itself popular with the local population. Yet, the Taliban seemed to do their best to alienate the
local population. They repeatedly massacred civilians [Rashid (2000), p. 70]. They beat women
in Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad for the slightest offense, eventually secluding the women of Kabul
in their homes with windows blackened to keep them out of sight.
38 When humanitarian aid
workers protested and threatened to cut off aid, the Taliban commanders reportedly implied that
the seclusion of women was necessary in order to control their own troops [Rashid, p106, p111]. 25
This type of destructive behavior can be interpreted as an attempt to lower wi, broadly
interpreted as the outside option of a defector. If a club member knows that he will find no
sanctuary among the citizens he is policing, the outside option is compromised and incentive
compatibility in (5) is strengthened. In contrast to other forms of destroying outside options, like
sacrifices, self-mutilation or destruction of human capital, alienation of the local population
imposes direct costs not on members but on nonmembers. The interpretation of gratuitous
destruction among innocent nonmembers as an incentive is reinforced by the fact that Sharia
restrictions were enforced more strictly in the conquered cities of Kabul and Herat than in the
provinces or in the Taliban’s home city of Kandahar (Rashid 2001, p. 40).
The same argument can be made at the level of a local governor. Afghanistan has a long
history of warring factions and sub-factions defecting in return for some payment by an outside
sponsor. The Taliban apparently had a practice of rotating local governors to the front or back to
Kandahar if they seemed to be consolidating a local power base (Rashid, pp 101-103).
Governors who alienated the local population fared better (Rashid, p. 105). That system could
also be interpreted as a type of gratuitous destruction in which a governor’s gratuitously harsh
treatment of the governed population limits his outside option, wi, reducing his incentive to
defect. 
Lowering wi took a much more literal form for Hamas members. From the organizations’
inception in 1988 it distributed leaflets calling on Palestinians to stop working for Israeli
employers, which would have amounted to an extreme sacrifice, especially among Gazans for
whom day labor in Israel accounted for up to 40% of GNP. That demand was ignored by the
general population and dropped at the time, though it was eventually achieved indirectly, when
Israel responded to suicide bombings by closing access to her labor markets for Palestinian day
workers. An important difference between Hamas and the Taliban is that Hamas is generally
much more careful about alienating nonmembers, apparently limiting attacks when they are
unpopular among Palestinians.
Agenda Drift
Referring back to Table I, the club good model with a militia technology can rationalize two
puzzles: self-destructive behavior among club members, and behavior that appears to be
gratuitously destructive toward nonmembers. (The latter category does not include acts of
terrorism, which members view as club “goods” since they advance a collective political
agenda.) What remains to be explained is the phenomenon of agenda drift, which I argued above
was evidence against an ideological explanation for the puzzles of destructive behavior.
For both the Taliban and the Hamas, ideological shifts can be rationalized as a form of
sacrifice. The Taliban ideology shifted dramatically and catastrophically over just a few years. It 
began with an emphasis on piety and local Islamic government as an alternative to brutal
warlordism. As the Taliban gained territory, income and power, they became more extreme,
welcoming payments from Bin Laden and Pakistan in exchange for establishing training bases
for radical Islamic militias (Rashid, 2000). Their reported ideological support for Bin Laden’s26
39 Perhaps revealingly, the Taliban foreign minister holding talks with Pakistan over a negotiated settlement
remained in Islamabad rather than return to Kandahar.
terrorist “Jihad” on the West was so strong that they were willing to risk all of their
accomplishments rather than deport him in the wake of the September 11
th attacks. 
In the context of this model, the Taliban’s catastrophic support for Bin Laden is not
puzzling if viewed as a mechanism of destroying the outside options of members. Once the
Taliban controlled Afghanistan, defection would have required migration. What more credible
way to destroy the outside option of stealing B and establishing, say, a restaurant in Chicago,
than declaring your absolute support for a global Jihad? In Figure 2, that sacrifice would appear
as a downward shift in the utility of a defector necessitated by an increase in B. When viewed in
this way, it is not surprising that in October 2001, despite the pleas of their Pakistani sponsors,
there was no serious discussion of deporting Bin Laden among the Taliban. Raising the issue
would have suggested a predisposition to defect, inviting severe punishment.
39
The establishment of the Hamas was in itself a sharp ideological shift in the stance of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza. Their traditional emphasis was on personal piety and the
establishment of local Islamic government. While in their view all of Palestine should eventually
be an Islamic state, that battle could wait till their primary goals were achieved. With the first
Intifada in 1988, the Muslim Brotherhood feared losing support to the PLO, their secular
nationalist rivals, and so they took a strategic decision to establish a militia and violently oppose
the occupation themselves. The Brotherhood could have opposed the occupation with minimal
territorial demands such as those of the PLO and restricted their attacks to the West Bank and
Gaza, which would have exposed their members and institutions to much less risk. Yet, they
chose a large and expensive ideological shift, claiming as their goal the liberation of all of
Palestine (including all of present day Israel) and carrying out attacks on civilians in Israel as
well as in the occupied territories. That shift in ideology undoubtedly contributed to increased
effort by Israel to arrest and detain militia members, resulting in years sacrificed in jail time.
This model can rationalize that expensive shift in ideology, again through the logic of
incentive compatibility. While the Muslim Brotherhood is a conventional religious sect with a
conventional club good technology , the Hamas is a militia with the club good
technology. Since the militia technology is much more sensitive to BR i B R i
i
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defection, it isn’t surprising that the militia requires a much more expensive signal of
commitment. The declaration by Hamas members of their intent to destroy the State of Israel
would heighten the perceived threat to Israel and thus increase their expected amount of jail time
sufficiently to provide the necessary signal.27
40 The Jewish Underground is well described by Israeli political scientist Ehud Sprinzak [1999] and by one
of the members,  Haggai Segal [1998], who wrote a book while imprisoned.
41 More recently another Jewish terrorist group has organized on the West Bank, this time among a group
closer to Ultra-Orthodox in practice. They attempted to detonate a bomb beside a girls’ school in East Jerusalem in
April 2002, are mostly Ultra-Orthodox from Bat Ayin, a small Jewish settlement outside Hebron (John Kifner, New
York Times, May 8, 2002.) While the perpetrators of that act were convicted in September 2003, the Israeli GSS
released other suspects in a related conspiracy which killed 8 Palestinians, for lack of an informant who would bring
forth incriminating evidence.
V APPLICATION: THE JEWISH UNDERGROUND AND OTHER MILITIAS
The club model of religious militias is designed to explain the puzzles in Table I. Its relevance
can be explored by examining its ability to explain the behavior of militias besides the Taliban
and the Hamas.  The Jewish Underground provides an instructive example because it
successfully carried out small projects but when it attempted larger projects the conspiracy
unraveled, exposing members to capture by the Israeli General Security Service and prosecution.
The Jewish Underground
The Jewish Underground was a violent militia which drew members from Gush Emunim, a
messianic religious movement of orthodox Jews which established settlements in the West Bank
and Gaza beginning in the mid 1970s.
40 Members of Gush Emunim believe that in settling the
holy land they hasten a messianic redemption of the Jewish people. Sociologist Gideon Aran
identifies some sect-like characteristics of Gush Emunim,
“It is a whole culture as well as a self-sustaining community. The hallmark of an activist-
believer is not confined to a religious viewpoint or political stance; it also emerges as an
encompassing system of behavioral norms which regulate all aspects of life, from
housing patterns to leisure-time activities” [Aran (1991) p. 303]. 
Aran goes on to list a set of behaviors that distance members from the prevailing culture,
including dress codes, amplified norms of worship, extended duration of Yeshiva attendance and
a distinct educational system. Yet members of Gush Emunim are not nearly as extreme in their
religious sacrifices or prohibitions, or in their mutual insurance activity or social service
provision, as are Ultra-Orthodox Jews, for example.
41
Most Gush Emunim members approved of aggressive vigilante activities against the local
Arab population as a means of reducing stoning of their vehicles and other attacks. [Weisburd,
1989]. They considered vigilante activity a legitimate response in view of the failure of the
government to provide adequate security to settlements. About a third of males in the early
1980s took part in some form of vigilante activity, which included threats, destruction of
property, detention and sometimes shooting [Weisburd, 1989]. 
Opponents of the settlers saw these actions as attempt to provoke local Arabs and to
pressure the military into suppressing stone-throwers  [Aran, 1991]. Nevertheless, Gush Emunim
settlers clearly felt that vigilante militias provided a local public good by enhancing their28
42 Sprinzak[1999, p. 169] discussing the report of deputy attorney general Yehudit Carp.
43 The conspirators believed that this crime would trigger redemption (or at least halt the peace process) by
either clearing the way for a Jewish temple to be built on the site of the ancient temple, or perhaps by triggering an
Armageddon-like conflict with Islam which would force messianic intervention. No branch of Judaism condones
acts which would blackmail the Almighty into dispatching the Messiah.
44 He inadvertently tipped off the GSS during his entrance interview and was tricked into revealing the
information [Segal, 1988].
45 Twenty eight members were subsequently convicted in connection to the different operations.
personal safety. Vigilante crimes were seldom successfully prosecuted, largely because
investigators were unable to find witnesses who would offer incriminating evidence.
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In the aftermath of Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem the prospect of Israel surrendering
control of  the West Bank and Gaza represented a threat to the messianic aspirations of Gush
Emunim settlers. In desperation, a conspiracy involving about a dozen men was established in
1978 to carry out an incredible plot to detonate the Muslim holy sites on the Temple Mount /
Haram A-Sharif.
43 While the conspirators made careful operational plans they could not find a
rabbinical authority who would authorize their project, and so they gave it up by 1982 [Sprinzak
1999, Segal 1978].
Following the murder by Fatah of six Yeshiva students in Hebron in 1980, leaders of the
Jewish settlement in Hebron sought individuals “of deep commitment and dedication” to carry
out a reprisal [Sprinzak, 1999], and turned to Menachem Livni, a leader of the Temple Mount
conspiracy. The “Jewish Underground” planted explosives around the vehicles of three
Palestinian mayors, maiming two (Bassam Shaka’a and Karim Khalef) and blinding an Israeli
sapper sent to  dismantle an explosive device. They also planted bombs in a mosque and at a
local soccer field. Subsequently, in revenge of the murder of a Yeshiva student, the Jewish
Underground murdered three civilian students in the Islamic College in Hebron in 1983.
The Islamic College killings were their first and last. The Israeli General Security Service
(GSS) had already obtained the identities of conspirators from a settler who had been approached
by the underground, had refused to participate and had subsequently applied to work at the GSS,
his outside option.
44 The GSS applied surveillance (and perhaps used an informant) and caught
the conspirators planting bombs in four civilian buses in East Jerusalem in 1984.
45 
The Jewish Underground provides an example of a militia that overreached its grasp,
attempting a project too destructive for its constituency to support. In terms of Figure 4, it could
be interpreted as choosing a project with B > B* (the maximum incentive-compatible level), thus
inviting an informant to defect. While their recruiting base, the settler population, was generally
supportive of vigilante violence, it balked at murdering civilians and could be induced to report29
46 The so called “New Jewish Underground” may prove to be more difficult to infiltrate and shut down, as
its members are much closer to Ultra-Orthodoxy. At this writing it has attacked a number of Palestinian civilians and
attempted to detonate a bomb out side a girls’ school east of Jerusalem. The Israeli police have made numerous
arrests but are having trouble gathering sufficient evidence to prosecute.
(or tricked into reporting) those activities to the authorities.
46 The leadership of Gush Emunim
subsequently split, with the mainstream denouncing and repudiating the Underground. Among
settlers the Underground fiasco contributed to the political maginalization of Gush Emunim.
Note that the Jewish Underground did not fail for lack of individuals who had a
religiously motivated inclination toward violence. Acting alone, Baruch Goldstein massacred 29
civilians at prayer in 1994. Yigal Amir, apparently in conspiracy with only his brother,
assassinated Prime Minister Rabin in 1995.   The Underground failed because they could not
consistently induce loyalty among members privy to their secrets. Projects as massive as the
September 11th attacks, the Temple Mount assault or the conquest of Afghanistan apparently
require not only motivated individuals but also the co-ordinated actions of a militia, in which
incentive compatibility (i.e., loyalty) is crucial.
Implications for other groups
Turning to other groups, the model clearly implies that radical religious militias will be active
when government provision of public goods is weak and when nonmilitia market opportunities
are poor. While a comprehensive study of cases is beyond the scope of this paper, that seems to
be the case in the Muslim world currently in Somalia, Nigeria, Algeria, Chechnya, Afghanistan,
Kashmir, Tajikistan, Yemen, Bosnia and the Philippines. Radical religious militias have
especially thrived during periods of weak government in Lebanon, Afghanistan and Egypt.
Collapse of Soviet government authority was accompanied by an increase in radical Islamic
militia activity throughout Central Asia, just as the collapse of Tsarist Russia was seven decades
earlier (Rashid, 2002). Saudi Arabia is an exception: a country with generous provision of local
public goods but an active radical religious militia nonetheless. 
The militia model also implies that subsidies to militias can dramatically increase not
only militia activity but also the intensity of prohibitions. That has been true in Afghanistan
since the early 1980s, when massive Saudi and Western subsidies to the Mujaheddin apparently
turned a relatively secular population into radical Islamists, long before the organization of the
Taliban. Similarly, subsidies from Iran have exacerbated radical religious practice and militia
activity by Hizbullah in South Lebanon.30
47 That is literally true only in the model. Efficient governments often do exclude access to public goods as
a means of law enforcement, but have less distortionary sanctions at their disposal as well, such as taxes and an
impartial judiciary.
VI  POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This economic model of radical Islamic militias has clear policy implications that flow directly
from the analysis of  incentive compatibility conditions (5) and (6) and the discussion of Figures
4, 7 and 8. Any intervention that weakens incentive compatibility will lower B*, the maximal
project value that a militia can undertake. Thus, a government which wanted to reduce militia
activity, increase attrition from militias and reduce self-destructive sacrifices by members could:
 
A. reduce subsidies to clubs operating militias which are spent on services provided only to
members, i.e., lowering C; 
B. improve alternative provision of local public goods accessible to both members and
nonmembers, i.e., raising G; 
C. reduce smuggling rents and other rents that clubs operating militias can aspire to capturing,
i.e., limit access to B; 
D. improve outside options, i.e., raise w.
It is worth stressing the contrast between outside subsidies to club goods and outside
subsidies to government-provided public goods. While both increase the flow of public goods to
the local population, subsidies to clubs can create an incentive to increase militia activity. The
critical difference is that government provision of public goods is nondiscriminatory, in the sense
that it is not conditional on some (possibly destructive) norm of behavior required by the club of
members.
47 For that reason raising C increases militia activity, as it increases the leverage clubs
have with members, while raising G reduces the influence of clubs by making them less
dependent on club services, reducing militia activity. Thus, outside subsidies to governments
will reduce militia activity if those governments provide services in a nondiscriminatory manner
to all residents. Nondiscriminatory provision of services by NGOs would fill the same function.
This raises the following dilemma faced by foreign aid organizations and well-meaning
foreign governments (Keating, 2001): What if the “government”behaves like a club, limiting
public good provision to loyal members, as the Taliban generally did? Then there is no essential
difference between aid to the “government” and aid to the club. Any transfer which increases the
leverage of that government with members has the potential to increase destructive behavior as
long as the governing club has the concern with defection expressed in equation (5). In Palestine
and especially in Afghanistan, aid organizations and NGOs attempt to provide nondiscriminatory
transfers (of food, education, health and welfare services) to a needy population. Militias,
historically including the Taliban, try to capture those transfers to increase their influence as
clubs. This situation places the humanitarian organizations and the militias in an inevitable
conflict, as aid, G, weakens the influence of the club. In extreme cases the Taliban chose to halt
aid to an impoverished population rather than agree to nondiscriminatory application of that aid. 31
The model indicates no solution to this dilemma as long as a single club has the power to
block aid (G) as the Taliban did. In the case of multiple clubs which act as discriminatory aid
distribution organizations, it may be possible to create competition between them. That
competition could bid down the “price” of access to aid which is paid by recipients in
conforming to norms of prohibition and sacrifice. Unfortunately, that competition could also
become violent.
Another course of action for foreign powers who want to weaken militias is to reduce
economic rents, B, available to be captured. In the Afghan case many of these rents are due to the
drug trade and the returns to smuggling caused by high duties and tariffs. For example, any
reduction in demand for heroin in Europe, the primary destination of Afghani opium, would
reduce rents available for Afghan militias to capture. As another example, a particularly
distorting institution was the Pakistani-Afghan agreement on goods imported in bond. Goods
bound for Afghanistan could be imported into the Pakistani port of Karachi free of Pakistani
duties and tariffs. They were then trucked legally into Afghanistan and almost inevitably
smuggled back into Pakistan, creating rents for Afghan smugglers and militias (Rashid, 2000). 
Recent Egyptian history provides an instructive example in weakening militias. Though
Gamal Abdel Nasser rose to power by creating a partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood the
alliance was short-lived. Feeling threatened, Nasser not only imprisoned the leadership but
nationalized the Brotherhood’s well developed social service provision network (Munson, 2002).
The subsequent decline in Brotherhood activity, both violent and benign, is consistent with
models’ prediction that the provision of benign local public goods is an essential part of the
organization.
Farther afield, limiting the ability of a club to provide benign local public goods, such
mutual insurance, was apparently part of a successful British policy to combat insurgency during
the imperial period. For example, the communist insurgency in Malaysia was apparently
controlled by aggressively enforcing a British monopoly on both violent and benign local public
good provision. The British managed to stabilize the military control of their allies and
eventually transfer power to those allies and leave peacefully.
The single most important tool in weakening militias may be improving the outside
options of members in order to encourage defection. The PLO provides an example. When their
Black September cell became a potential liability to the parent organization in the early 1970s, it
was successfully retired by providing members with steady jobs, apartments and even brides in
Beirut.
Strengthening outside options is a mechanism through which economic development can
weaken militias, as appears to have happened in Northern Ireland. It is important to point out that
economic development may be effective in weakening militias even if activists within a militia
are not disproportionately poor, and support for militia activities is not disproportionately among
the poor, findings reported by Krueger and Maleckova (2002a, 2002b). A club which is
strengthened by its ability to provide local public goods may attract members for any number of32
reasons, and select leaders and combatants from among those members according to
characteristics other than poverty. Returning to the September 11
th example, one would hardly
expect Al Qaeda to send some of its’ semi-literate mercenaries from a training camp in
Afghanistan to flight school in Florida if there were some disaffected students in Europe
available. In any case, the club good model focuses not on the popularity of the militia but on its
effectiveness. The most effective militias do seem to require large infrastructures and a
committed membership, which do seem to be disproportionately located  in places with poor
market opportunities and poor government provision of local public goods (e.g., Afghanistan,
Palestine, Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria, Chechnya, Pakistan, Yemen, Bosnia and Kashmir).
These policy recommendations are not novel, yet they are strengthened by derivation
from a model grounded in rational choice which can explain the behavior of radical religious
militias. The model offers essentially constructive policies to limit militia activity. It suggests at
the very least a two-pronged strategy for countering terrorists and militias. One prong would be
conventional: intelligence, infiltration, deterrence and counterattack, including weakening the
benign infrastructure of organizations like Hamas and Taliban which provide both benign and
violent local public goods. The other would be constructive: economic development and aid to
stabilize governments which provide local public goods in a manner that does not discriminate
between club members and nonmembers. Self-determination could be one of those local public
goods. The pervasiveness of radical religious sects currently providing social services
throughout the world suggests that without a seriously constructive effort, the war on terrorism
may be a long one.33
VII CONCLUSIONS
Can rational choice modeling help explain the effectiveness and destructiveness the Taliban,
Hamas and other radical religious militias? This paper has argued that these puzzles can be
explained by a club good model which emphasizes the function of these voluntary religious
organizations as efficient providers of local public goods in the absence of government
provision. This is the same approach that can rationalize the puzzling behavior of Christian
religious sects (Iannaccone 1992) and Ultra-Orthodox Jews (Berman 2000). That model has
clear policy implications.
It is efficient for these organizations to extract signals of commitment in order to prevent
free riding in their mutual aid activity. Their expertise in extracting signals of commitment
makes these nonviolent sects excellent potential militias, since commitment of members is
crucial to militias, which can be easily compromised by defection. This approach can also
rationalize seemingly gratuitous acts of violence of group members toward themselves and
toward others. These destructive acts erode the outside options of members, making them more
committed agents of the militia.
Destructive and even self-destructive militia activity can be explained by a rational
choice model. This is hopeful news for policy interventions based on constructive incentives.
The recommended policies are intuitive: economic development and support for governments
that consistently provide basic social services, including law and order in a nondiscriminatory
manner.
One might ask, if the model is so compelling, why did radical Islamic militias spring up
in the 20
th century, but not earlier? Standard microeconomic theory would predict a decline in
time-intensive religious activity as wages increase. Berman (2000) addresses this apparent
paradox, arguing that signaling behavior was not necessary in the absence of a strong outside
option to the club in provision of mutual insurance and other local public goods. The advent of
high wages in a modern secular economy threatens the club with selective attrition of its most
able members. That threat increases the need to signal commitment in order to select out
potential free-riders. In that sense, radical Islam is the backlash of a mutual insurance club
against the threat that markets pose to their survival: namely wage opportunities which induce
attrition of their most able members. That backlash creates a supportive environment for militias
because it develops techniques of measuring commitment crucial to successful militia activity.
The other special characteristic of the last few decades is technological change in militia
activity, particularly in terrorist attacks. New technologies allowing a small number of
conspirators to do a devastating amount of damage and to publicize their act almost instantly
have dramatically increased their ability to provide a public “good” to their constituency. Of
course, small numbers reduce the risk of betrayal.
While the model does not directly address the recent phenomenon of suicide attacks, the
logic of sorting through signals provides at least one relevant insight. Rational choice models
struggle with suicidal terrorists. We tend to think that most people either do not believe that their
self-sacrifice will be justified by the political return to their own group, are not sufficiently
altruistic to carry it through, or do not believe in the hereafter. Imagine a population with a34
48  Strictly speaking, self-determination would be a club good only if it is excludable, which is inconsistent
with the Western democratic model  but may occur nonetheless.
distribution of individual beliefs, a small minority of which are extreme or even pathological (a
Timothy McVeigh, for example). In isolation from an organized militia, these individuals seldom
do much harm, and when they do these acts are isolated and nonrecurring. Now imagine a
provider of benign social services whose contact with that population allows it to observe signals
of belief. That provider could then identify extremists and psychopaths for a militia, effectively
harvesting the extreme tail of the distribution of beliefs. Once identified, organized and armed,
that minority could cause recurring damage. Those ideas are pursued in a separate paper
(Berman and Laitin, 2003).
This paper has tried to make the case for a functional, economic view of radical religious
militias. It should not be understood as arguing that ideology and theology are not important,
though their role has been omitted in the discussion in order to see how far a functional approach
can take us. Incorporating ideology and militias with nonreligious ideologies is a subject for
future research.
Further Research
Radical religious militias show broad similarities with secular organizations with violent rent-
capture technologies. Street gangs and well-organized criminal organizations (such as the Hell’s
Angels) often practice self-destructive norms such as prohibitions on legal work. These groups
often show behavior which is clearly misogynous or in other ways destructive of others, which
could be interpreted as (efficiently) destroying outside options of members. Militias with
nonreligious ideologies seem to thrive when they simultaneously provide benign and violent
local public goods. The Khmer Rouge, the Vietcong, the IRA and the Sicilian Mafia are
examples of that pattern. These topics, which economists have generally left to the tools of
sociologists and anthropologists, might benefit from reexamination using the club good model.
One way to think about ideology within the context of this model is to introduce some
political ideology, such as a desire for self-determination, into an individual’s utility function as
a public good that a government or club could provide.
48 In this context a popular desire for self-
determination strengthens a club (or government) which promises to provide that public good.
This paper should not be understood as arguing that improving market opportunities alone will
be sufficient to overcome a religious or ideological movement or a demand for political public
goods. It does argue that a government which effectively provides public goods, both economic
and political, will reduce the appeal and the effectiveness of violent militias.
Finally, public economics has generally adopted as a working assumption the classical
liberal approach of Smith and Hume, assuming that individuals have a direct relationship with
the state and with markets. This paper follows Iannaccone (1992) in arguing for an approach to
public policy that takes seriously the more complex relationship that individuals have with clans,
sects, tribes and other groups, which often mediate or compete with an individual’s relationships
with states and markets. 35
Policy
In short, radical Islam has a problem with Adam Smith, not so much on ideological
grounds but for practical reasons. An efficient market economy and a functioning secular state
threaten the network of affiliations that support the internal economies of radical religious sects,
which allow social service provision through tithing, donation of time and mutual insurance.
Markets and functioning governments reduce the reliance of members on that sect for social
services, reducing the influence of the sect on members.
The policy implications outlined in the paper for a war on terrorism flow from an
understanding of the three forces competing to provide economic services to members of
religious sects: the market, the government and the sect. When sects prevail they can potentially
use their influence and information to run militias with deadly efficiency. They are efficient as
militias because the cooperative provision of social services and cooperative militia operations
turn out to be very similar activities. If markets and governments prevail, militias are weakened
because defection to the secular alternative becomes more attractive. Militias become harder to
organize and easier to infiltrate.
The models’ recommendations are essentially constructive. A government wanting to 
weaken a religious militia should strive to replace the social services provided by the militia’s
parent religious sect with services provided by some combination of functioning markets,
government, and nondiscriminatory NGOs. One method would be to weaken the benign
infrastructure of a particular radical sect, but in order to innoculate against religious militias in
general,  the recommended method would simply be to develop a well-functioning market
economy, with all the complexity and effort involved.36
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